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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSS TELFORD, dba
TELFORD CONSTRUCTION CO.
Plaintiff - Respondent

vs.
NEWELL J. OLSEN AND SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation,

I

Case No.
12119

Defendant - AppeUant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The Respondent contraverts certain of the facts as contained in the respective paragraphs of Appellant's Brief in
particularity as follows:
First: The first paragraph of Appellant's Statement of
Facts read in part as follows:
"The Defendant employed another subcontractor to
perform certain clean up work to Plaintiffs sub-contract,
after Plaintiff failed to perform said work in accordance
with the specification."

1

ADDITIONAL FACTS
,

!
1

The Plaintiff respectfully submits the following statement of additional facts.
Fifth: The canal and flood.way, as laid out in the plans
shown ,to the Plaintiff when he entered into the contract
showed the alignment to be generally on higher ground
(Tl99). Immediately after the Execution of the contract,
Paintiff commenced work on the project but was stopped.
(Tl08-9). There was a delay in getting the work started
again and almost immediately thereafter the alighment of the
canal was change to lower ground which resulted in the
Plaintiff working low, wet, muddy earth (THO). As a general practice of the trade, Plaintiff, when he bid the job, contemplated that the excavation work on the canal would be
completed before the cement structures for diversion of water from the canal were installed ( T108 and 109).
Sixth: Defendant's employees moved in ahead of the

Plaintiff's work and constructed many cement structures, so
that the Plaintiff's heavy equipment was required to work
around these structures, to his claimed substantial damage.
Plaintiff threatened to quit the project in November of 1966
but Defendant promised, under these changed conditions, to
pay Plaintiff a bonus of $2,000.00 if Plantiff would continue
and complete the contract ( Tl63-23). Plaintiff completed
the work thereafter (T143-16; 155-5; 311-10; 314-22). Defendant then refused to pay the bonus for extra work done by
the Plaintiff during construction. The case required three
days of trial and the record is voluminous.
ARGUMENT
NO ERROR IN INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant's points 1, 2, 3 and 7 of a Arguments in the
3

This was a disputed fact for the jury. Newell Olsen
President of Defendant, said to Plaintiff that he would
IMr. Price do some olean lup work on the canal at no cost to
Plaintiff ( Tl21-21). Plaintiff told Olsen he didn't need
Price's services, but Olsen went 1ahead and had the work
done anyway. (T122-18 ).
As to the offsets, Plaintiff agrees that Defendant had
the right to offset legitimate accounts, but the dispute is
over certain items which Plaintiff claimed were improper
such as interest, which charge Defendant's bookkeeper admitted was improper ( T28-8). Other disputed offsets were
the Chevron Oil Company Bill and the Kenneth Price and
Ross Hall bills. (Pl EX 27).
Second The bonus offer of $2,000 was initially set out in
the letter of November 15, 1966 (Pl EX 7) but Newell Olsen
reaffirmed the offer in other letters of January 13, 1967
(Pl EX 6), February 21, 1968 (Pl EX 4) and March 12,
1968 (Pl EX 5). Plaintiff relied on this offer (T170-9), and
completed the work ( Tl55-5) but the bonus was never paid.

Third: Plaintiff agrees with paragraph 3 of Appellant's
Statement of Facts therein stated.
Fourth: The Respondent adds the following:
That other expert witnesses testified that the general
custom of the trade was to put the cement headgates and
structures in after the earthwork or banks had been built.
Larry Telford, (T118-27); Mr. Merl Izatt, (T239-4); Mr.
Steve Grover (T260-24). Mr. Johnson, Defendant's expert,
who is quoted in Appellant's Brief, was general contractor
who had the responsibility for both the earthwork and structure work at the same time, and, therefore, controlled when
each could be done ( Tl97-20), as would best meet his con·
venience.
2

brief complained about the instructions to the jury. The Defendant, at the trial made no objection to the Court's instruction to the jury and took no exceptions to the Court's refusal
to give his requested instructions.
. The law of Utah is well settled that a party may not assign as error the failure of giving instructions unless he objects thereto. Rule 51 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly so
provides.
A recent pronouncement of the law in this State is the
case of McCall vs. Kendrick 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P2d. 962,
and 963.
"The gravement of Plaintiff's appeal as presented
this Court relates to alleged errors concerning instructions to the jury. The record fails to show any exceptions
to instructions given or the refusal of request. Rule 51
of our Rules of Civil Procedure states: "No party may
assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his objections." Notwithstanding this rule, Plaintiff appeals to the discretion
of this Court to consider his contentions under the exception stated in the rule that even though no exception have
been taken, this Court may - - - in its discretion and in the
interests of justice - - - review the given or the failure to
give instructions.
It must be kept in mind that the language just quoted
is not the rule, but the exception. Normally, the rules
themselves must govern procedure and are to be followed unless some persuasive reason to the contrary invokes
the discretion of the Court to extricate a person from a
situation where some gross injustice or
otherwise result. The burden of showing special circumstances which would warrant a departure from the rule
rests upon the party seeking to vary it. Plaintiff
ma?e
no such showing here. The record does not ment the mvocation of the exception referred to, but is to the contrary."
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Aside from the fact that Defendant made no objection
to the failure of the Court to give his request No. l, there is
no merit to the Court failing to give the instruction. The request asked the Court to quote two paragraphs of the contract. The whole contract was before the Jury. They could
read the contract and no doubt did. These provisions were
dicussed at length in the arguments, and there was no reason
why the Court should pick out these two paragraphs of the
contract and read them to the jury. Neither is there any mer' it to the Defendant's argument in points 2, 3 and 7 regarding
other instructions. If Defendant wanted the kind of instructions that he now asks, he did not ask the Court to give
any such instructions at the trial. See his requested instructions ( Rll 7 to 128).
1

The Court fully instructed the jury as to the theory of
the case, both of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and set out
the specific items claimed by both parties ( T391-393). The
Plaintiff testified at length and presented evidence as to the
different claims by independent witnesses. Defendant disputed much of Plaintiff's testimony. The issues were submitted to the jury who rendered its verdict for the Plaintiff.
In the Utah case of Hill vs. Coward, 14 Utah 2nd 55, 377
P2d. 186. The Court stated.
"The purpose of the requirement in Rule 51 U. R. C. P.
that objections to instructions be made before the jury
retires to consider it verdict is that if the objections call
attention to error, correction may be made before the jury goes to deliberate. This is the primary fun?tion of obto lay. a foundation
posjections, and it is not
sible reversal by the losmg party, if that eventuality occurs, as sometimes seems to be assumed."

We are in accord with the conclusion of the trial Court
that the objective of the trial was accomplished. That the
parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to present
their evidence and contentions and there is no valid grounds

5

the law and the evidence was not sufficiently specific.
In the Utah case of Steele vs. Wilkinson 10 Utah 2nd
159, 349 P2d. 147-149 it is stated:
. "Error is also assigned to the giving of certain instructions to the Jury. Many of the objections now urged on
appeals were not urged in the trial court and thus need
not be considered by this Court, there being no showing
of special circumstances why these objections were not
made below."

Reference is now made to these respective points under
Appellant's Brief:
POINT I
OFFSETS
One major issue in the case, as to offsets, was
whether or not the Kenneth Price bill of $799.50 should have
been an offset against the Plaintiff's account, because Mr.
Olsen told Telford that he would have Price do some work at
no cost to Telford (T121-21). Mr. Price made it clear he
was a separate sub-contractor of the Defendant ( T308-6)
and he was not working for Plaintiff, and at no time did Mr.
Olsen tell him or indicate to him that he was doing any work
required of the Plaintiff (T314-23). The question of whether Plaintiff completed or performed his contract and work
was a question for the Jury. If Plaintiff completed his work,
then obviously the Defendant would not be entitled to offset
Mr. Price's bill in any amount. Defendant could only offset
this bill under the terms of pargraph 6 of the Addendum
Agreement, if there was unfinished work of the Plaintiff.
These matters were all properly presented in the argument
to the Jury. The question of a proper or improper offset
was essentially one of fact, and not a matter of law, as Defen7

for reversal of the jury verdict. See Hales vs. Peterson lJ
Utah 2d 411, 360 P2d. 822, 825, which states as follows:
" . . . . . To the extent the verdict can easily be set
aside by the court, the right to trial by jury is weakened.
:In order to give substance to the right, once the trial has
beei:i had and a verdict rendered it should not be regarded lightly, nor overturned because of errors or irregularities unless they are of sufficient consequence to have affected the result.
Anyone acquainted with the practical operation of a
trial by jury and the human factors that must play a part
therein is aware that it would be almost impossible to
complete a trial of any length without some things occurring with which counsel, after the case is lost, can find
fault and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good faith,
magnify into error which to him and the losing parties
seems blameable for their failure to prevail. However,
from the standpoint of administering evenhanded justice
the court must dispassionately survey such claims against
the over-all picture of the trial, and if the parties have
been afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly present
their evidence and arguments upon the issues, and the
jury has made its determination thereon, the objective of
the proceeding has been accomplished. And the judgment should not be disturbed unless it is shown that there
is error which is substantial and prejudicial in the sense
that it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the result would have been different in the absence of
such error, which we have concluded does not exist here."

case.

The above authorities appear to be controlling in this

In this case of Employers Mutual Liability Co. vs. Allen
Oil Co. 123 Utah 253, 258 P2d 445, it held that objection to
instructions must be specific and direct the Court's attention
to the specific matter in the instruction that is complained ·
It further held that an objection and instruction was agamst
6
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The bonus off er and all other so-called clean up work, whether waived or not, was supported by more than ample consideration. The case cited by Defendant in its brief, Straw vs.
Temple 49 Utah 258, 159 P. 44 at page 48 states the exception to the general rule as follows:
"But where the party refusing to complete his contract
does so by reason of some unforeseen and substantial difficulties in the performance of the contract, which were
not known or anticipated by the parties when the contract was entered into, and which cast upon him an additional burden, not contemplated by the parties, and
the opposite party promises him extra pay or benefits if
he will complete his contract, and he so promises, the
promise to pay is supported by a valid consideration. In
such a case the natural inference arising from the transaction, if unmodified by any equitable considerations, is
rebutted, and the presumption arises that by the voluntary and mutual promises of the parties their respective
rights and obligations under the original contract are
waived, and those of the new or modified contract substituted for them. Cases of this character form an exception to the general rule that a promise to do that
which a party is already legally bound to do is not a sufficient consideration to support a promise by the other
party to the contract to give the former an additional
compensation or benefit." 1 Whart. Cont. Sec. 500.
The consideration in this case was as follows:
(a) When the job was originally bid by the Plaintiff,
it was on the basis that the concrete structures would be
placed in after the earthwork. ( T108-109).
( b) That the canal alignment was set as indicated in
the specifications and plans. ( T109).
( c) That he could proceed with work without delay.
Right after Plaintiff moved their equipment in and started
to work the Plaintiff was stopped because of right-of-way
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dant
in its brief. The Courts instructions (T392-393)
were fair and proper and correctly left these issues to the
Jury.
POINT II
CLEAN UP WORK
Defendant's argument here again is begging the question. The record is repleat with consideration to support the
changes during construction. Counsel for the Defendant in
its brief, is assuming that the Jury found that the Plaintiff
11ever completed his contract. This is contrary to the evidence presented by the Plaintiff that the job was complete
when he left the job with his equipment in September 1967
(Tl43-16; 155-5; 311-10; 314-22). It is clear that where
there is a dispute in the evidence, the Jury should be allowed
to determine the issues of fact. On appeal, the Supreme
Court is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Gibson vs. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 84 Utah 452, 36 P2d. 105, the court said whether or
not the plaintiff suffered permanent injuries was a question
for the jury "and the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed
if there is competent evidence to support it." In Wineger vs.
Oregon Shortline R. Co. 77 Utah 594, 208 P. 948. The court
says
"There was a conflict in the evidence and the issue was
determined soley on the weight and credibility of. the
testimony . The case was properly submitted to the 1ury.
Under the facts the verdict is conclusive."

This is the well recognized rules in this state.
POINT III
LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR BONUS
Defendant's argument under its point 3 is without merit.
8

work done by Mr. Telford done satisfactory, in your opinion, in building the canal way and the floodway and canal banks?"
Answer:
"Yes, I would say so."

Mr. Price further stated that the banks were completed
when the Plaintiff pulled his equipment off the job (T31422). This is the same Mr. Price whose bill for $799.50 the
Defendant was trying to offset against the account of the
Plaintiff.
Before Mr. Telford bid the job his son Larry walked the
canal and floodway alignment (T207-6). After the job was
started, at least 50% of the alignment was changed ( T208-2)
from the high ground to the low muddy ground ( T208);
wherein it took more dirt to build the banks and different
equipment was needed ( Tlll-8). Another dragline was
moved in to move the dirt (T75-16).
In addition to the above consideration the Plaintiff did
other items of extra work during the job and Plaintiff's exhibit No. 26 represents the bill presented to Defendant which
he had not paid, even though Mr. Newell Olsen agreed oraliy to pay a fair price for this work (T220-l; 230-8; 139-7).
These many problems caused Plaintiff's cost to double
(Tl15 and 209). Plaintiff relied upon the bonus and extras
to help defray these extra costs. (T170-9).
The above items represent considerations for the bonus
offer of $2,000 and any waiver as it may have related to socalled clean up work. It would have been an error for the
Court to have taken this question of consideration from the
Jury. The case of Smith vs. Brown 50 Utah 27, 165 P.
486 cited by Defendant, has no similarity to the facts of this
case.
11

problems (Tl08-16). Defendant moved ahead of Plaintiff,s
earthwork on the canal banks and put in cement structures
in the right-of-way, which caused Plaintiff serious delay, expense and cost, working around these cement structures
while building the banks. ( Tl09-21; T116 to 118.8; T209;
T210; T218; T240; T246-ll). The problems of the interference were so bad that Kenneth Price, another sub-contractor
of Defendant (T308-5) who had been an excavation contractor for over 10 years ( T306-26) and working on this job for
Defendant testified when asked the following questions
(T310-ll):
Question:
"Now, I'll ask you a question. If you would have been
Mr. Telford and working under those conditions at the
time with his equipment that he was using and with the
structures being placed ahead of you, as it was, would
you have continued to work under those conditions."
Answer:
"I wouldn't have, no."
Question:
"Why?"
Answer:
"Well, the delay in time and working around the struc·
tures, it's just too hard to do."
Question:
"And would this also have cost you extra money?"
Answer:
"Yes, it would have
Question:
"Do you have an opinion as to whether they (canal banks)
were satisfactorily completed by Mr. Telford? Was the

10

Larry Telford's testimony:
Question:
"What did your Father say to Newell in your presence
concerning the moving of extra dirt at 20 cents a yard?"

Answer:
"He told Newell that he didn't want any more extra work
over what he had for the same price he bid it for."
Question:
"What did Newell say?"
Answer:
"Newell said he'd see that we got a fair rate on this extra work that we done."

See also the testimony of Ross Telford on this point
(Tl35) wherein his opinon was that 35 cents was a fair price
for the 9624 yards of extra dirt moved.
Phil Whiting, the Government Engineer stated that 35
cents was a fair price (T270-14).
Paragmph 5 of the contract cited by Appellant provides
that the Defendant would pay a reasonable addition . . . . .
to the contract price for changes made in the contract.
Plaintiff was entitled to the reasoriable price of 35 cents per
yard on the extra dirt moved as a contract right.
POINT VI
STRUCTURES: CUSTOM OF TRADE
As to Point VI of Appellant's Brief the testimony was almost without contradiction that the usual custom of the trade
was to put the earth banks in first and the structures after;
Ross Telford ( T118-27); Merl Izatt ( T238-22) Steve
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POINT IV
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
As to Appellant's point IV, the record shows that the job
was completed when Telford left as shown above by Mr.
Kenneth Price (T3ll-10; T314-22). Mr. Telford further
stated that "when I left the job it was completed." (Tl4316; Tl55-5). With the apparent dispute in the evidence the
Jury had a right to believe the Plaintiff.
Mr. Phil Whiting, the Government Engineer, quoted in
Appellant's brief, did not know what Mr. Telford exact
work requirements were as related to the whole contract
( T281-22). He stated that the banks were completed except
for smoothing and that this was less than 1% of the total work
Whiting further stated that Telford's work was satisfactory and in accordance with the plans and specifications
(T282-22), and he had no complaint about Telford's work
( T282-30). The testimony of Whiting, in Plaintiff's opinion,
supports the other evidence that the job was complete when
the Plaintiff left At most Whiting's testimony would be a
possible conflict with the other evidence, whereby the Jury
would resolve the conflict.
POINT V
ADDITIONAL EARTHWORK COMPENSATION
The evidence shows that Mr. Olsen waived this provision
of payment at 20 cents per yard for the extra dirt moved. Be·
cause of the many problems encountered by the Plaintiff as
above set forth, Mr. Newell Olsen told Mr. Ross Telford and
Mr. Larry Telford that they would get a fair price for the ex·
tra dirt as follows: ( T223-l 4 ) .
12

The Defendant acted as his own sub-contractor when it
came to the installation of the cement structures ( 103-18).
The evidence is overwhelming that such conduct of placing
the structures ahead of Plaintiff's earthwork was an unreasonable interference with Plaintiff's work. Defendant's foreman on the job, Mr. Preston Olsen, had Plaintiff's operators
complaining to him about this intederence ( T333-4), and
yet he did nothing about it. Plaintiff claims this intederence
slowed him down 50%. (T246-12). Preston Olsen, Defendant's foreman, claimed it was 10%. (T336-13). Plaintiff only
sought recovery for a 15% delay (Pl. Ex. 27-6) (T-32-27).
Newell Olsen testified in his desposition that "we were inter' fering with each other all along. (T103a-29). Mr. Newell
Olsen pretty well indicated Defndiant's attitude when he
testified (TlOla-24) as follows:
". . . . and I will not admit to having any obligation
to keep those structures out of Mr. Telford's way while
he was way behind on his contract."

The intederence experience suffered by the Plaintiff
was unreasonable. This was for the Jury to decide. The
provision of paragraph 4 of Section 3 of the contract, cited by
Defendant, does not apply to Plaintiff's claim for damages
because of the unreasolllable intederence and breach of contract by Defendant. The Jury was properly instructed and
awarded damages accordingly.
POINT IX
GENERAL VERDICT WAS PROPER
The following additional authorities cited by the Defendant do not have similar facts and the law stated is not
persuasive herein:
15

( T260-18) all
above experts in earth moving construction. Defendants expert, Mr. Johnson, said it is done
both ways, but it is to be noted that he has only seen it done
both ways when he was responsible for both the earth work
and structure work. In this situation the contractor could do
what he felt would be most advantageous to him (Tl97-'16).
Here again the Jury had the right to determine the facts from
any dispute in the evidence and Defendant's argumentis
without merit.
POINT VII
NOTICE OF DELAY
Defendant's point VII is without merit since there was
not a problem of delay in the completion of the project as the
project was completed on time without any penalty to the
Defendant. This action here was for damages for breach of ,
contract by Defendant, as hereinafter set forth.
1
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POINT VIII
RIGHT TO DAMAGES
As to Point VIII, the provision as cited by Defendant
only applies if there was no breach of the contract. It is
Plaintiff's contention that the contract was, in fact, breached
by the Defendant under the tenns of said contract as follow:
Part of paragraph 3 of the contract provides:
" . . . . Contractor (Olsen) shall act as liason with all
its sub-contractors so as not to permit any
to unreasonably interfere with the progress of this
contractor,
and to damage any work of this
sub-contractor.

14
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This was not a promise by Plaintiff to do the work of the
original contract but to carry out the changes in the alignment in the canal changing the work to wet, lower ground,
and other considerations.
C.

OTHER COMPENSATION:

( 1 ) Plaintiff was entitled to compensation for reasonable value for extra work and services rendered in accordance
with paragraph 5 of the original controct.
( 2) Plaintiff was entitled to damages for interference
with his work by the Defendant.

( 3) The evidence offered by Plaintiff showed a total
due the plaintiff of $8500.00 which was more than sufficient
to support the verdict of $5500.00. No authorities have
been cited that the Jury must itemize the items making up
their verdict, much less when there was no request for the
Jury to itemize the items.

All disputed facts were settled by the verdict.
Respectfully sumitted,
B. H. HARRIS of PRESTON, HARRIS,
HARRIS & PRESTON

31 Federal Ave. Logan, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
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Smith vs. Brown 50 Utah 27, 165 P. 468, is where the
Judgment for the Plaintiff, on a promissory note was reversed, on
that the note was conditioillally delivered;
the condition bemg that the note was to be paid out of profits of the business and for services rendered.
O'Brien vs. Wallace 145 Colo. 291, 359 P. 1029:
This was a will contest, where the contest was based on
the claim that the will was not properly executed and the
testatrix was incompetant. The verdict for the contestant
was set aside on the ground that there was no evidence that
the will was not properly executed, and the issue should not
have been submitted to the Jury. The case does not hold a
general verdict will be set aside where the verdict does not
disclose the grounds upon which the verdict was rendered.
Defendant never requested a special verdict and he should
not now be allowed to complain.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. Instructions: The assignment of points as to in·
structions are without merit, for the reason that there were
no execptions to the instructions or refusal to give Defend·
ant's requests. There is nothing in the instructions now proposed that indicate any merit in claim for a new trial or any
permasive reason why the Court should extricate the Defendant from gross injustice.
B. Bonus: The assignment that the promise to pay
the bonus was without consideration is without merit.
( 1)

The promise to pay the bonus is admitted.

( 2) The claim of no consideration for the promise to
pay the bonus was without consideration is not valid.
16
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